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Introduction
In contrast to the situation just a few years ago, it is now well established,
both in theory and in practice, that public opinion is a significant factor in the
process of European integration1. This significance will almost certainly continue;
it may even increase. Although there has also been considerable growth in
research in this area, most of the research has focused on evaluations of
European integration and has tended to pay less attention to how much people
actually know about the European Community or European Union. In fairness,
the neglect of the knowledge factor has been due in the main to a dearth of data.
Thus, Wessels, in a comprehensive analysis of the development of support for
integration, attempted to deal with the cognitive dimension but had to recognize
that, given the available data, this could only be tackled indirectly: “One
possibility might be to use direct measures of knowledge or perception. Another
possibility is to tackle the question indirectly by asking whether people have
developed an orientation towards the EC. For practical purposes we choose the
second method”. (Wessels, 1995, p.110). In the same volume Niedermayer and
Sinnott analysed measures of knowledge but only in relation to the one European
institution for which such measures were then available, namely, the European
Parliament. In short, data availability has greatly hampered research on the
cognitive dimension of attitudes to the European Union2.
It can be argued that the lack of detailed research of this kind is more
serious in this instance than it might be in other contexts. The probability is that,
given the remoteness and the embryonic nature of the European political system,
attitudes to it are likely to be less well informed and less well structured than
attitudes to national politics. Consequently, a clearer and more comprehensive
picture of the knowledge or lack of knowledge underlying attitudes to European
integration is essential in any attempt at a fuller understanding of the nature of
European public opinion.
Against this background, the paper begins with a brief consideration of the
quality of the data on how much the public knows about the European
Community or European Union3. It then explores the criteria that ought to be
applied in assessing the adequacy of whatever level of knowledge is found to
exist. This is followed by a description of how much people actually know about
the European Union, focusing mainly on the situation in the spring of 1993 and
paying particular attention to perceptions of decision-making and representation.
This account is supplemented by consideration of some evidence from the spring
of 1995 on knowledge of European and national decision-making in three
particular policy areas. The paper then turns to the “so what?” issue, examining
some empirical evidence regarding the effects that variations in levels of
knowledge appear to have on attitudes to integration. Having shown that
knowledge matters, the paper attempts to determine why people have different
levels of knowledge. Some indication of this can be found in the public’s
perception and evaluation of the available sources of EU information; if people do
not know where to find the information or if they tend to seek it from sub-optimal
sources or if they lack confidence in the sources, the end result is likely to be low
levels of information. It may well be, however, that the public’s knowledge is
conditioned by more fundamental socio-demographic and political factors; it may
also be conditioned by the domestic political and institutional context within which
people learn about and react to European developments. Accordingly, the paper
presents a multivariate analysis of the sources of differences in levels of
knowledge, taking into account not just communication variables and socio-
demographic factors but also variables that seek to capture some of the variation
in the way in which the European Union is experienced across the member
states. A brief concluding section provides a summary and some reflections on
the findings.
The available data
The main body of data in this area is the series of Eurobarometer surveys
conducted for the European Commission. Over a long number of years these
have asked repeatedly about levels of awareness of various Community
institutions. With rare exceptions, the examination of the cognitive aspect of
orientations towards the Union in the Eurobarometer series did not in the past go
beyond this rather vague and intangible notion. More recently, the quality of
Eurobarometer data on knowledge of the European Union has improved
substantially. Specifically, Eurobarometer 39 and 40 (spring and autumn 1993)
have considerable data on this topic and subsequent Eurobarometers have
extended these detailed investigations by examining knowledge of additional
aspects of EU institutions or policies. The analysis that follows focuses mainly on
the data from Eurobarometer 39 and introduces evidence from later
Eurobarometers where this throws further light on the matter. Before proceeding
to examine this evidence, however, it is necessary to consider the criteria by
which the levels of knowledge which prevail might be assessed.
How much is enough?
One way of attempting to answer this question is to take account of how
European citizens themselves judge their level of knowledge. According to the
spring 1993 Eurobarometer, a very substantial majority (71 per cent) of
Europeans felt that they were not well informed about the European Community
as compared with 27 per cent who felt they were well informed. The range runs
from the 54 per cent feeling not well informed in the Netherlands to 79 per cent in
Italy (Eurobarometer, 1993a, p. A30). Before leaping to the conclusion that there
is a great hunger out there among the public for more Euro-information, however,
it should be noted from Eurobarometer 40 that only 23 per cent agreed with the
statement “I really need to know a lot more about the European Community”;
whereas 38 per cent chose the response “I would like to have some more
information about the European Community” and 28 per cent opted for “As far as
I am concerned, I am happy with what I already know” (Eurobarometer, 1993b, p.
A37).
A more important yardstick in assessing levels of EU knowledge is the
level of knowledge of national politics and the national political system. This is a
useful corrective to the danger of taking low levels of EU knowledge out of
context and drawing dire conclusions. Perhaps knowledge of the national political
system is just as low and the problem really lies with knowledge of politics and of
political institutions as such. Accordingly, the presentation of the data on levels of
knowledge of the European Union that follows will be accompanied by
consideration of some evidence of knowledge of national politics.
Finally, if one were to take a normative perspective, either one derived
from democratic theory or from a commitment to European integration, one could
perhaps establish a yardstick by which to evaluate the existing state of
knowledge among the public. For example, from an integrationist perspective it
could be argued that, given the nature of the issues raised by the current phase
of integration, the successful completion of the European project requires a high
level of public knowledge and understanding of the process and of the issues
involved on the part of the European public. How else is support for complex and
far-reaching developments such as European Monetary Union to be assured?
The problem is that it would be extremely difficult to quantify what either the
minimum or the desirable level of knowledge should be. Accordingly, this paper
will confine itself to examining this aspect of the matter from an empirical
perspective by investigating the relationship between levels of knowledge and
support for integration.
Knowledge of European affairs
A comprehensive account of prevailing levels of knowledge would require
a survey dedicated to this topic and any small set of questions will have certain
limitations. The knowledge questions in Eurobarometer 39 have a strong
institutional bias: they ask about the membership of the Community, the location
of the Commission, the name of its president, the names of incumbent
Commissioners, which is its most powerful institution (in the sense of having the
final say on legislation) and who elects the MEPs4. Despite this institutional
orientation, however, these questions can probably be treated as indicative of
more general levels of knowledge and understanding. In any event, knowledge of
how the Union functions is one of the key aspects of an adequate public
understanding of European affairs and has a particularly important bearing on the
problem of the democratic deficit and on the legitimacy of the Union.
A series of eight questions dealing with knowledge of the above topics can
be used to form an index of knowledge of the EU; scores on the index cover a
thirty point range (from 0 to 29)5. Dividing such a scale up into discrete levels
evaluating the significance of each level is difficult and inevitably somewhat
arbitrary. Two considerations should be borne in mind in this regard. First, most
of the questions are very simple, indeed it might be argued that some are
simplistic, and they might be regarded as no more than the minimum that a
reasonably well informed European citizen ought to know about the Union (the
exception to this is the question about the membership of the Commission). The
second point to bear in mind in interpreting scores on such an index is that, with
several of the questions offering only two alternatives, guessing is easy and
relatively rewarding. This results in an inflation of the scores relative to the real
level of knowledge. Bearing this in mind, the scores are divided as follows in
Figure 1: 0-5: “no knowledge”; 6-11: “very little knowledge”; 12-17: “some but not
much knowledge”; 18-23: “moderately well-informed” and 24-29: “very well
informed”. On this interpretation of the scale, 10 per cent of the citizens of the
European Union are very well informed and a further 24 per cent are moderately
well informed. This means, however, that two-thirds (65 per cent) emerge, with
“some but not much knowledge” or less. This less well informed majority of the
European citizenry comprises three groups: 26 per cent with “some but not much
knowledge”, 24 per cent with “very little knowledge” and 15 per cent with “no
knowledge” at all. If the countries are ranked on the basis of the combination of
the proportions who are very well informed and moderately well informed,
Denmark and Luxembourg have the most knowledgeable publics, followed by
Belgium, Greece and France. The least knowledgeable are Italy and the former
East Germany, followed by Northern Ireland, Britain and West Germany6.
It was suggested above that, before any hard and fast conclusions are
drawn about levels of knowledge of the EU, such levels need to be seen in the
context of how much people know about the national political system. It is
extremely difficult to devise precisely comparable scales of knowledge at the
national and supranational levels and this difficulty is reflected in the fact that the
scale used in the Eurobarometer 39 report to measure national knowledge is
based on only four questions, compared to seven questions in the European
knowledge scale in the same report. The four items cover the name of the capital
of the country, the name of the prime minister, the institution having the final say
on legislation and the identity and role of the head of state. Accepting that a scale
based on such questions provides only an approximate basis for comparison of
national and European levels of knowledge, the contrasts are still striking. Across
the twelve member states in spring 1993, 78 per cent showed high to very high
levels of knowledge of the national political system in comparison to only 38 per
cent showing such levels in relation to the European system7 (Eurobarometer,
1993a, p. 55-59).
More detailed examination of the responses to two of the individual
questions that go to make up the index of European knowledge reveals particular
problems in regard to knowledge of key aspects of the functioning of the
institutions of the European Union. The first of these two questions deals with
which of the European institutions is seen to be most powerful «in terms of
having the final say on European Community legislation». Across the Union, one
quarter of the citizens have no opinion on this matter. A plurality (35 per cent)
attribute decisive power (erroneously) to the European Parliament (see Table 1).
A further 20 per cent express the stereotypical view that the bureaucrats in
Brussels (i.e. the Commission) decide everything; the correct answer (the
Council of Ministers) was chosen by one-in-five. The only countries with a
significantly above average correct response are Denmark, Luxembourg and, to
a somewhat lesser extent, the Netherlands. Given the novelty of their accession
to the Community and indeed the novelty of their experience of democracy, it is
perhaps not surprising that it is the people of former East Germany who are most
prone to exaggerate the role of the European Parliament. Likewise, given the
stereotypes prevalent in the British debate about European integration, it comes
as no surprise that the greatest tendency to exaggerate the role of the
Commission is found in the United Kingdom (see Table 1). The most important
feature of all of this, however, is the lack of awareness of the role of the Council
of Ministers: 79 per cent either don’t know who decides or don’t realise that the
power of decision lies with the representatives of the national governments. This
suggests that the subtleties of elite debates about intergovernmentalism versus
supranationalism and about the intricacies of qualified majority voting in the
Council of Ministers do not have much resonance in public opinion.
It might be argued that, erroneous though the notion that the European
Parliament has the final say in legislation is, it establishes some degree of
legitimacy for the European policy process. However, other considerations aside,
the degree of legitimacy that might be regarded as being conferred in this way
must be seen as highly attenuated in virtue of answers to the second of the
questions singled out above. Asked the apparently simple question «who elects
the members of the European Parliament?» and presented with a card showing
two incorrect and one correct option, only two out of five respondents chose the
correct response (see Table 2); this was after three rounds of direct elections and
a mere year or so before a fourth round. Again quite understandably, former East
Germany shows the lowest rate of correct response (27 per cent). It is also
notable that three of the four countries with reasonably high levels of correct
response (Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece) have compulsory or at least quasi-
compulsory voting which results in very large proportions of the adult populations
in these countries participating in the very process referred to in the question
“who elects the members of the European Parliament?”. On the other hand, Italy,
which had compulsory voting until 1993 and continues to have very high turnout
in European elections, has a lower than average level of correct response (35
per cent) to the question and Denmark, which has relatively low levels of turnout
in European Parliament elections, is among the countries with the highest levels
of knowledge of who elects the European Parliament. Mention of Denmark draws
attention to another institutional or contextual variable that may affect the level of
popular involvement with European issues and that may therefore lead to
increased levels of knowledge, namely, the holding of referendums on EU
issues. Of course, knowledge could also be increased by institutional factors
having little or nothing to do with participation, for example, the mere presence of
a major European institution in a country. These and other contextual variables
will be considered in exploring the origins of differences in levels of knowledge
later in this paper.
In order to fill out this account of the state of knowledge of European affairs
among the European public, it is worth noting some data from a more recent
Eurobarometer which provide evidence on knowledge in relation to certain key
policy sectors. In Eurobarometer 43 respondents were asked about their
perception of the allocation of decision-making power over a wide range of
policies between national governments and “the European Union level”. The
question wording was as follows:
“In fact the (nationality) government together with those of the other countries in
the European Union, have agreed that a number of policy areas will be decided
jointly within the European Union, and not by each country separately. Can you
tell me which areas of policy are already, at least to some extent, decided at the
European Union level?”
Among the 22 issues listed in the question were three which provide a
particularly telling test of public awareness of what is arguably the key to the
whole integration process, i.e. the sharing of decision-making power between the
national and supra-national levels. The three issues were: ‘agriculture’, ‘foreign
policy towards countries outside the EU’ and ‘defence’. Since it became fully
established in the late 1960s, the Common Agricultural Policy has been the pre-
eminent common policy of the Community and one of the clearest examples of
the transfer of decision-making to the European level. One would presume that
after some twenty five years of the CAP, much of it marked by controversy and
frequently punctuated by all-night negotiating sessions in Brussels, the fact that
that agricultural policy is “at least to some extent decided jointly within the
European Union/decided at the European Union level” would be widely
recognised by the mass public. Given that two treaty changes and a good deal of
recent debate about European integration have focused on the development of a
common foreign policy, one would also expect a reasonably widespread public
perception of the actual decision-making process in regard to foreign and
defence policy, i.e. that the former is decided “at least to some extent” at EU level
and the latter is not8.
Despite the assumed salience of the CAP, in only five of the fifteen
member states do majorities of the citizens realize that agricultural policy is
decided “at least to some extent” at European level. The realization is most
widespread in Finland (69 per cent) and Denmark (64 per cent), followed by
Sweden (58 per cent), the Netherlands (56 per cent) and Luxembourg (56 per
cent). At the other end of the scale one finds the four Mediterranean countries
(Portugal 26 per cent; Italy 27 per cent; and Greece and Spain 34 per cent).
While some of the dearth of knowledge in these latter countries might be put
down to the northern European orientation of the CAP over the years, the fact
remains that only 35 per cent of people in the main paymaster-country
(Germany) realize that agricultural policy is made at European level and the
realization remains a minority one in two of the main beneficiaries -Ireland (42
per cent) and France (48 per cent) (see Figure 2).
Turning to perceptions of foreign and defence policy, the bar-chart in
Figure 3 presents two bars for each member state, the first one showing the
perceived attribution of defence matters and the second showing the perceived
attribution of foreign policy to the European Union. In a well-informed public, the
first bar should be quite low and the second should be quite high. This correct
configuration of perceptions is not in fact found in any member state. Finland
comes closest: there only 12 per cent see defence decisions being made at
European Union level; on foreign policy, however, only 46 per cent of Finns get it
right. After Finland, the next most informed in regard to defence policy are
Sweden, Ireland, Austria and Greece but, even more than Finland, all of these
are marked by a serious under-estimation of the European input into foreign
policy-making.  Denmark is the best informed in regard to the European
dimension of foreign policy formulation but a very substantial minority of Danes
erroneously attribute decision-making on defence to the European Union. At the
other end of the scale in terms of perception of joint decision-making on defence,
the outcome is equally if not more surprising: over 40 per cent of people in
France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg believe that
defence issues are decided “at least to some extent” at EU level; furthermore, the
publics in these countries see no difference in European Union involvement in
decision-making on foreign policy and decision-making on defence9.
In summary, whether measured by means of some composite index of
knowledge or by individual items such as those relating to legislative power in the
European Union or to the mode of election to the European Parliament or to the
decision-making process in key areas such as agricultural policy, and foreign and
defence policy, the level of knowledge of Europe and European affairs among
the mass public seems lamentable. But lamentable in what sense? In other
words, do low levels of knowledge have any practical political consequences?
The implications of ignorance
There is indeed no guarantee that increased knowledge of the workings of
the European Union would lead to increased support for it. Eurosceptics would
no doubt argue that the contrary outcome is the more likely and the evidence
does indicate that there are some very well informed opponents of European
integration. However, an examination of the relationship between levels of
knowledge of the EU and attitudes to European integration in general and to the
Maastricht Treaty and the issue of a common currency  in particular indicates
that variations in levels of knowledge do have substantial political consequences.
Table 3 presents data on the relationship between level of knowledge and
attitudes to integration which show clearly that attitudes to integration as
measured by approval of a country’s membership of the Union, by belief that the
country has benefited from membership of the Union and by a feeling of
enthusiasm for the Union (feeling very sorry if the Union were to be scrapped),
are closely related to knowledge. For example, enthusiasm for the Union goes
from 22 per cent among the least informed to 67 per cent among the best
informed, an increase of 45 percentage points; in fact enthusiasm rises by about
10 percentage points with each step up the knowledge scale. Consideration of
attitudes to the Maastricht Treaty throws further light on the matter. If we take as
a measure of support for the Treaty on European Union how people would have
voted in a hypothetical referendum in 1993 to decide its fate, the proportion who
would have voted yes goes from 23 per cent among those with no or almost no
knowledge to 65 per cent among the very knowledgeable (the question was: ‘if
there were a referendum (in Denmark, France and Ireland: another referendum)
on whether or not to agree with the Maastricht Treaty, would you vote for or
against?’). The main effect of low levels of knowledge on attitude to the Treaty is
to increase indecision and ambivalence rather than opposition. Across the
Community as a whole, levels of indecision regarding Maastricht increase from
15 per cent to 55 per cent as one goes from the top to the bottom of the
knowledge scale. The final section of Table 3 suggests, however, that the
negative  effects of low levels of knowledge on support for integration are not
always confined to indecision. When the issue is that of the move to a common
currency, support increases with knowledge (from a low of 31 to a high of 66 per
cent) but the least knowledgeable are both more indecisive and more opposed
(see Table 3). It must, of course be acknowledged that the relationship between
knowledge and attitude to integration is a complex one and cannot be reduced to
a simple one-way causal process by which knowledge leads to support. But, just
as it is unlikely that the influence is entirely one way from knowledge to support, it
is equally unlikely that it is one-way in the opposite direction. In short it is highly
probable that the influence is mutual: more positive attitudes lead an individual to
acquire and retain more information and more information in itself leads to more
positive evaluation10. With this qualification and in this sense, knowledge
matters at a practical political level. The pressing question then is: why is the
level of knowledge of the European Union so low among so many?
Information sources: takeup and credibility
Eurobarometers 39 and 40 asked respondents “When you are looking for
more information about the European Community (the EC), its policies, its
institutions, where do you look first?”. In asking the question the interviewer
handed the respondent a card with a list of possible sources of information. The
list was not identical in the two surveys: the first version of the question (EB 39)
took quite literally the notion of ‘looking for more information’ and, presumably on
the grounds that one does not, as such, go to television and radio to seek
specific information, did not include them as a possible source. In the following
Eurobarometer, this assumption was relaxed and TV and radio were included11.
Taking account of the results of both questions, it is clear that the mass media
are the dominant perceived sources of information about the European Union. In
the first form of the question a substantial plurality (46 per cent) referred to daily
newspapers as their first port of call for EU information. When television and
radio were added to the list in the second version of the question, these media
displaced daily newspapers at the head of the list but newspapers still remained
a substantial source (television and radio, 51 per cent; daily newspapers, 42 per
cent). In both surveys, the mass media were followed, though at some
considerable distance, by the category of other newspapers and magazines and
by discussion with relatives, friends and colleagues (see Table 4). What is
perhaps most striking in Table 4 is the paucity of resort to official sources of
information: information on noticeboards in town halls, post offices, railway
stations or libraries attracts about one in twenty; more or less the same can be
said for EC-information offices, Euro-information centres and Euro-libraries and
for specialised government information offices. A major obstacle in the way of the
effectiveness of such official sources of information is the sheer lack of
awareness of their existence: when told that “Various institutions and
organizations have specialised departments offering detailed information about
the European Community or about specific European Community issues” and
then asked “Have you heard about any such information services before today?”,
82 per cent in the Union as a whole said they had “never heard about such
information services” (Eurobarometer, 1993b, p. A41). With one notable
exception, there is little or no variation between the member states in this
overwhelming lack of awareness of official EU information services. The
exception is Denmark, where lack of awareness of such information sources falls
to 58 per cent; Denmark is also, as noted above, one of the countries with the
best informed public.
The question underlying the data just discussed is somewhat hypothetical.
The question assumes that the respondent actively seeks out information about
the European Union. Since many respondents may never have actually sought
such information, the data in Table 4 are best taken as indicating a propensity to
consult various potential sources if the need were to arise12. There is, however,
a second subjective measure that helps to fill out the picture of public reaction to
different channels of communication. Respondents were asked whether they
trusted or did not trust each of a given list of sources ‘from which information
about the European Community, its policies, and its institutions can come’. This
assumes only that the citizen is a more or less passive recipient of information
rather than an active seeker of it. It also has the advantage of allowing for the
assessment of the credibility of a number of sources which are not often
consulted for EC information but which may carry such information. The
frequency of trust in eleven such sources is set out in Table 5.
Across the European Union as a whole, there are three sets of sources
with significantly different levels of trustworthiness. With a level of thrust of about
60 per cent, the four most trusted are educational establishments (i.e.
universities and schools), radio, television, and the European institutions
themselves. Next, at about the 50 per cent level, come the press and the
domestic political authorities (national, regional and local). The third and last
group (ranging from 41 down to 32 per cent) consist of (in descending order)
trade unions/professional associations, the church and business.
In regard to trust in sources of information, the former East Germany
stands out as a case apart. It is significantly below the European average on trust
in all sources except three: the national authorities, the European institutions and
trade unions/professional associations. Some strong contrasts in trust in
particular sources are also, however, evident between the other countries: trust
in television as a source is particularly high in the Netherlands (76 per cent) and
particularly low in France (49 per cent); trust in the church is particularly high in
Ireland (64 per cent) and Northern Ireland (67 per cent) and quite high in
Portugal and Greece (57 and 51 per cent respectively) but particularly low in,
once again, France (22 per cent); trust in the national authorities is highest in the
Netherlands (76 per cent) and lowest in Italy and Spain (39 per cent in both
cases). Some of these contrasts are indeed quite striking; whether they affect the
absorption of information about Europe is, however, another question and one
that requires a systematic analysis of what determines people’s level of
knowledge of the European Union.
The determinants of levels of knowledge of  European affairs
The range of potential influences on people’s knowledge of European
affairs is considerable. First there are the obvious socio-demographic factors of
age, occupation, education and gender. Education may be thought to be of
special importance because it makes various channels of communication
accessible and facilitates the processing and organisation of information. But,
apart from such differences, people vary in the extent to which they avail of
different channels of communication and sources of information. Accordingly,
interest in EU politics, general media consumption and frequency of political
discussion are potentially independent influences on levels of knowledge whose
effects need to be taken into account. Party politics is another potential channel
of communication, the expectation being that individuals with a stronger and
more enduring relationship to a political party (usually referred to as party
attachment) will have higher levels of knowledge. The acquisition and retention of
information is presumably also affected by awareness of appropriate sources and
by degrees of trust and mistrust that may be vested in them. In addition to these
individual-level variables, however, learning about the European Union and
European affairs takes place in different national political contexts. Mention has
already been made of the possible effects on knowledge and awareness of the
EU of the holding of referendums on EC/EU membership, being host to a major
EU institution or having high turnout in European Parliament elections. One other
variable should perhaps be added to these: duration of membership of the
Community. It might be expected that the longer a country has been a member,
the greater the opportunity for successive generations of its citizens to become
thoroughly familiar with the main institutional features of the Community. Of
course, an opposite argument could also be made: as the event of joining the
Community recedes into history, the dimmer the recollection of particular features
of the Community becomes. On the latter interpretation, duration of membership
would be inversely related to level of knowledge.
The range of potential determinants and the possible overlaps between
them give rise to obvious difficulties in teasing out the impact of any individual
factor. To take a simple example, suppose it is found that older people are less
well informed about European affairs and also that those with less education are
less well-informed. The question then becomes: is the age contrast simply due to
the fact that older people on the whole tend to have had fewer years of formal
schooling or is there a genuine age effect? Questions about overlapping
causation could be multiplied at will. What is required is a means of assessing
the impact of each of the various factors mentioned while holding the other
factors constant; in short, the approach to the problem must be multivariate.
Table 6 shows the results of a multiple regression, with the index of
knowledge of the EU as the dependent variable and six sets of independent
variables which measure various aspects of (a) the institutional and political
context in which individuals experience the EU, (b) the socio-demographic
characteristics of the individuals themselves and (c) their response to various
potential channels of communication.
The regression ‘equation’ (i.e., all the independent variables taken
together) explains 37 per cent of the variation in levels of knowledge. Though at
first sight this may seem to leave a very large amount of unexplained variance, it
is in fact quite a good outcome for data of this sort. The relative impact of each
variable is indicated by the beta coefficient for that variable in the first column of
numbers in Table 6 and the direction of influence is indicated by whether the
coefficient is positive or negative13.
Among the hypothesised contextual variables, the level of turnout in
European Parliament elections has the strongest positive effect on the level of
knowledge of the European Union (beta 0.211). The duration of a country’s
membership has a substantial effect but in the opposite direction: the longer the
length of membership, the less well-informed the public (beta -0.159). The
presence of a major European institution also raises the level of knowledge
(0.134) and the final contextual variable, the experience of holding referendums
on EU issues has a positive but more modest effect (0.087).
Allowing for these contextual effects, the most important individual
characteristic is, not surprisingly, education (beta 0.169); years spent in formal
education either directly impart more knowledge of European affairs or, more
probably, provide the means of acquiring it. Obviously, social class and
education are related to one another. However, even taking this relationship into
account and allowing for the direct effect of education just noted, social class has
an independent effect on knowledge of the European Union: irrespective of
educational differences, being a manual worker has a substantial negative effect
(-0.105). Other less important but still significant negative factors are increasing
old age14 (-0.051) and being a farmer (-0.048). The effect of the age variable is
not surprising and may be due to a combination of generational and life-cycle
effects: European integration has simply not loomed as large or for as long in the
lives of older people and, even if it had, their powers of attention and recall may
be diminishing. The negative farmer effect is more surprising: surely, it might be
thought, farmers would be particularly attentive to and well informed about EU
affairs, since the EU is the direct source of a good deal of their material welfare.
Apparently not, or, to be more precise, while they may know all about headage
payments and grants for suckler cows they are not so well informed about the
political process that delivers these benefits.
The results reported in Table 6 indicate that there is a substantial gender
factor in levels of knowledge of European affairs: allowing for differences in
education, interest in politics, propensity to discuss politics, media consumption,
etc., women remain significantly less well informed about the EU (coefficient -
0.135). What lies behind the difference is a matter of conjecture: women could be
less well informed because the burden of looking after young children falls mainly
on them and leaves them with less time and resources for paying attention to
European affairs; alternatively, perhaps it is not current responsibility for young
children that inhibits the acquisition of information about Europe but the fact of
rearing or ever having reared children, with the inhibiting effect increasing with
the number of children involved. Variables measuring both of these factors (being
a woman with young children and the total number of children born to a woman)
were included in the equation; as shown in Table 6, each has a significant effect
in the predicted direction (beta for number of children: -0.033 and for being a
mother with young children: -0.028). The effects are, however, small compared to
the dominant effect of gender as such. In short, differences in level of knowledge
between men and women cannot be explained in terms of differential parenting
responsibilities. It is possible that some other gender-related variable may play a
role and the matter deserves further investigation. In the meantime, however, the
finding of a significant gender effect on knowledge of European affairs stands.
So far the analysis has made it clear that contextual and socio-
demographic factors have substantial effects on how much people know about
the EU. Over and above these effects, however, knowledge is also affected by
the extent of which individuals are “plugged in”, literally or metaphorically, to
various channels of communication. At the most general level, there is the
question of whether people are interested in European politics or not. It may even
be that this is the beginning and end of the matter: those who are interested will
be well informed; those who are not interested will know little or nothing.
Accordingly, the first step beyond the analysis of political context and the socio-
demographic characteristics of individuals is to look at interest in European
politics or, as this was defined in the question, in “matters related to the
European Community”. Not surprisingly, interest in European politics in this
sense has a very substantial positive effect on levels of knowledge (beta 0.194).
But it is by no means the end of the story: even among people with the same
high or low degree of interest in European politics, level of knowledge is affected
by their access to a whole range channels of communication.
The most obvious and most effective channel of communication is overall
media consumption: whatever the level of interest, the greater the media
consumption, the higher the level of knowledge (beta 0.123). Discussion of
politics reinforces this effect (0.081), as does a sense of attachment to a political
party (0.034). It is true that party attachment (“feeling close to a political party”)
does not appear to have as strong an effect as media consumption or political
discussion; nonetheless it does seem to act to some degree as a channel of
communication which links the individual citizen to the wider political world and
enhances knowledge of that world.
Apart from these general channels of political communication, level of
knowledge is also affected by orientation to specific sources of knowledge about
the EU. These orientations or tendencies to resort to and to trust various sources
of information have been described in some detail above. A difficulty in dealing
with the data in Tables 3 and 4 was that there were so many discreet items of
information; this difficulty is compounded if one is seeking to assess the effects of
these various orientations. In an attempt to deal with this problem, factor
analyses of the responses to the questions on source of information and trust in
sources were carried out. These showed that there are indeed clear patterns
underlying the individual items. Four factors emerge from the factor analysis of
responses to the question “when you are looking for more information about the
European Community, its policies, its institutions, where do you look first?”. The
four factors are: a current affairs source-orientation, an official source-orientation,
a collective/corporatist source-orientation and, finally, the absence of any source-
orientation. Three factors (trust-distrust of the media, trust-distrust of collective or
corporatist sources and trust-distrust of official sources) emerge from the
analysis of the trust-in-sources items15. The question is: do these source-
orientations and source-evaluations affect knowledge of the EU?
The situation seems to be that having an orientation to consult various
sources of information can make a difference and that the degree of difference
depends on the nature of the orientation. A current affairs source-orientation
(looking both to newspapers and magazines and to discussions with family,
friends and colleagues as sources of information) has a substantial positive effect
on knowledge (beta 0.115); a tendency to look to official sources has a slightly
less but still quite positive impact (0.093); a collective/corporatist source
orientation (expecting to acquire information at meetings, or from trade union,
professional or consumer associations) has a much smaller impact on level of
knowledge. Not surprisingly, the absence of any source-orientation (literally not
knowing where to look for information) has a significant negative effect. The
effects of trust in various sources is more complex. Distrust of official sources
has no effect one way or the other. Distrust in the media, however, is associated
with lower levels of knowledge, though the effect is slight (beta -0.015 with a
significance level (0.062) just above the conventional cut-off point). In the case of
collective or corporatist sources, there seems in fact to be such a thing as a
healthy scepticism: a syndrome of distrust in trade unions or professional
associations, churches, business, and schools and universities as sources of
information about the European Union16 actually has a small but significant
positive effect on the respondent’s level of knowledge (beta 0.033).
Overall then the evidence suggests that considerable progress can be
made in identifying the sources of low levels of knowledge of European affairs.
We know that, irrespective of individual-level characteristics, if a person comes
from a country which has high turnout in European Parliament elections, which
hosts a major EU institution, which has joined the Community in one of the later
waves of accession, and, or which holds referendums on EU issues, that
person’s knowledge of the EU is likely to be higher than it would otherwise be. In
addition, knowledge is adversely affected by a range of socio-demographic
variables: low levels of education, a manual occupation, and advancing years.
Less predictable but quite striking is the impact of gender: other things being
equal, women are less informed than men17. The tendency for farming as an
occupation to reduce levels of knowledge may also be regarded as surprising in
view the dependence of most farmers on the European Union for much of their
income. In terms of attitudes and orientations, interest in EU affairs plays an
important but not an overriding role. Media use, political discussion and party
attachment also help; their impact is consistent with the fact that a tendency to
look to current affairs sources has a greater positive effect on knowledge than a
tendency to look to collective or corporatist sources. Finally, scepticism as to the
trustworthiness of various sources is either neutral in the case of official sources,
negative if it is directed at media sources and actually positive, that is associated
with a higher level of knowledge, if it relates to collective or corporatist sources.
Conclusion
Impending political developments and the overall challenges facing the
European Union suggest that a fairly rigorous yardstick should be applied in
assessing the adequacy of the public’s knowledge of European affairs. By any
standards, however, the level of European knowledge is low. Lack of knowledge
relates to a range of institutional and policy areas and involves in particular an
overestimation of the power of the Commission and of the Parliament and an
underestimation of the role of the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, a large
segment of public opinion seems unaware of the Parliament’s representative
character. All of this may contribute to a feeling that ‘Europe’ is something out
there that imposes its decision on ‘us’ and to an underestimation of the degree of
accountability that actually exists. The evidence certainly suggests that low levels
of knowledge diminish support for the European Union, for the Maastricht Treaty
and for further developments in integration. For the most part this is because the
ill-informed are indecisive or ambivalent but there is also some evidence that
ignorance can generate opposition.
The findings regarding the origins of ignorance of the European Union and
European affairs have been summarized in some detail in the section
immediately preceding this conclusion and need not be rehearsed again here.
What is perhaps worth dwelling on, however, is not so much this or that particular
finding as an overall impression that emerges from a number of the findings:
knowledge is lower if one lives in a country in which accession to the Community
took place a long time ago and at a stage when there was little or no controversy
about membership; conversely, as well as being higher in countries that have
joined more recently, it is higher in countries which have publicly debated
integration issues and decided on them in referendums; it tends to be higher also
in countries which have high turnout in European Parliament elections; at the
individual level, knowledge increases with interest in European politics, frequency
of political discussion, feeling close to a political party and tending to look to
current affairs coverage and discussions as sources of EU information. This adds
up to an overall picture in which politics and the politicization of European issues
enhances knowledge. Since European issues are constantly becoming more
politicised, this may be taken as an encouraging sign from an integrationist
perspective. It also, however, implies a dilemma: the politicization of issues may
increase knowledge, which may in turn lead to greater levels of support for
integration; on the other hand, politicization may also generate opposition. The
question is which tendency will predominate? The answer to this question will
determine whether the outcome of the politicization of European issues will be a
public opinion that is increasingly informed and supportive or one that remains ill-
informed and increasingly opposed.
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NOTES
1. Though the received image of integration theory (neo-functionalism and all that) is exclusively elite-
centred, already in the early 1970s theories of political integration were emphasising the role of public opinion
and especially the point that, if integration were to begin to make inroads on the basic functions of states,
public opinion would assume a greatly enhanced role. For a discussion of the role accorded to public opinion
in theories of European integration, see Sinnott, 1995.
2. This is in striking contrast to the situation in the United States where knowledge of politics has become an
increasingly prominent topic in research on public opinion (see, for example, Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).
3. The change of name from European Community to European Union might be seen as a reflection of the
insouciance of the Maastricht decision-makers regarding public opinion; it has certainly created problems of
style and usage for those who write about European integration. European Union will be used here despite the
fact that most of the data, dating as it does from spring 1993, relates to knowledge of the European
Community. European Community will be used where precision of reference is required, for example in the
headings of the tables and figures and occasionally in the text.
4. The questions are listed in full in Appendix 1.
5. Details of the scoring of each question are given in Appendix 1.
6. The Eurobarometer uses separate samples for the former East and West Germanies in its studies of
German public opinion. From the point of view of the present research, the opportunity of comparing levels of
knowledge among two populations with such different experiences is quite valuable and will be availed of in
this paper. Separate samples are also taken in Great Britain and Northern Ireland; although sample size in the
latter case is very small (300), it too is presented separately where appropriate.
7. The scale of European knowledge used in the Eurobarometer report was based on a slightly different
subset of items from the survey. The Eurobarometer scale produces only 2 per cent in the very well informed
category but otherwise more or less confirms the finding of the present study that slightly more than one-third
are reasonably well informed and that a large majority are poorly informed. The differences in scale
construction can be identified by comparing Appendix 1 in this paper to the relevant methodological
discussion in the Eurobarometer report (Eurobarometer, 1993a, p. 58-59).
8. As tortuously specified in Article J4 of the Maastricht Treaty, joint decision making on defence is a matter
for the future: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all question related to the security of the
Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common
defence”.
9. The German public does see a difference but in the wrong direction: 45 per cent see defence as a matter
subject to  joint decision and only 38 per cent say the same for foreign policy. The evidence of low levels of
knowledge of the respective competences of national and EU authorities is consistent with other recent data
on preferences regarding attribution of policy responsibility. The standard Eurobarometer question in this area
produces very low levels of “don’t know” responses (an average of about 6 per cent). However, when the
question is posed in more exploratory way and when the response categories specifically allow for a non-
committal response, more than one-third of respondents have no opinion on the matter (Blondel, Sinnott and
Svensson, 1996, p. 23).
10. With a view to quantifying the extent of the influence in each direction, further statistical analyses of the
data are in hand.
11. Note that only the categories changed; the wording of the basic question remained the same (see
question wording at foot of Table 9). As well as the addition of TV and radio, other less significant changes
were made to the set of response categories (see Table 4).
12. Note that in Table 4 about one-quarter of respondents either say they don’t know where they look first for
EU information or they never look for such information or are not interested. Thus one quarter lack any
connection, however tenuous to any EU information network. The proportion who have never actually sought
out EU information is probably much higher.
13. The other two columns of numbers give the t statistic and the significance of t.
14. The age variable was defined in quite specific terms in order to capture the effect of ageing: an individual’s
score was zero if he or she was under 65; from 65 on the value of the variable was the respondent’s actual
age.
15. The details of the factor analyses are presented in Appendix 2.
16. See factor 3 in the second factor analysis in Appendix 2.
17. It is worth emphasising again that the gender effect obtains even after controlling for differences in level of
interest and involvement in politics, different levels of education and differential parenting responsibilities.
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